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Abstract—Full duplex (FD) communication promises signifi-
cant performance gains under ideal network settings. Generally,
it has been shown that the throughput and delay gains of
FD communication are somewhat limited in realistic conditions,
leading researchers to study other possible applications where
significantly higher gains over half duplex communication can
be availed. The potential of FD nodes in improving the physical
layer security of a communication link is investigated in this
contribution. Specifically, we present a thorough analysis of the
achievable secrecy rate for a transceiver pair in FD mode in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper assuming a generic system
model. The ergodic secrecy rate with FD communication is found
to grow linearly with the log of the direct channel signal to
noise ratio as opposed to the flattened out secrecy rate with
conventional half duplex communication and irrespective of the
eavesdropper channel strengths.
Index Terms—Full duplex, 5G, Physical layer security, ergodic
secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Full duplex communication, i.e., simultaneous transmission
and reception on the same radio resource, can ideally allow
doubling of the throughput over conventional half duplex
transmissions. In that respect, it has the potential of becoming
a key technology component in addressing the challenging
design targets of the 5th Generation (5G) wireless system [1].
The potential of full duplex (FD) communication in providing
a throughput (TP) gain [1], [2], and/or improving the trans-
mission latency [3], [4] is well studied.
The compelling gains with FD communication are condi-
tioned on: i) perfect self interference cancellation, ii) avail-
able traffic at both ends to exploit the arising transmission
opportunities, and iii) similar levels of network interference
with FD and half duplex (HD) transmissions. Considering
practical SIC levels, i.e. self interference power suppressed to
a constant noise-floor like level [5], result in a reduction of the
TP gain, which are further limited when a practical downlink
heavy traffic profile is considered. Finally, and perhaps most
interestingly, simultaneous transmission from both ends result
in an increase in the number of interference streams in the
network, leading to higher inter-cell interference (ICI) for a
network of FD nodes and subsequently further reduction of
the possible TP gains [6].
Due to the somewhat limited TP gain and latency reduc-
tion, other potential applications of FD communication have
started being investigated recently. The requirement of having
symmetric traffic in order to exploit FD opportunities have
lead to studying FD transmission for scenarios with symmetric
traffic profile such as backhaul communication and cooperative
communication. Physical layer security approach focusing on
the inherent capacity of the propagation channel to secure the
transmission against potential eavesdropper is also envisioned
as a potential application area for FD communication.
The performance of secure FD relaying has recently been
analyzed for single hop [7] and multi-hop [8] relays. However,
reference [7] assumes non-negativity of the secrecy rate,
whereas reference [8] assumes perfect SIC; both being opti-
mistic. The authors in [9] show that FD relaying achieves sig-
nificantly higher secrecy rates than HD relaying with optimal
power allocation considering the amplify-and-forward (AF)
relay. In the non-cooperative scenario, a transmit beamforming
scheme for a full duplex base station (FD-BS) considering
physical layer security guarantee for the system with multiple
passive eavesdroppers is proposed in [10]. However, this
contribution focuses on developing a transmission scheme to
optimize the secrecy rate under simplified assumptions.
Main Contributions: The ergodic secrecy rate of FD com-
munication is thoroughly analyzed in this contribution, and
compared against that of an equivalent HD link. In particular,
we present a closed form expression for the ergodic secrecy
rate considering the generic Nakagami-m fading channel and
non-ideal SIC. The strictly positive secrecy rate assumption
is also relaxed. We show that the the ergodic secrecy rate
grows linearly with the log of direct channel’s signal to noise
ratio (SNR) with FD transmission as opposed to flattened out
secrecy rate in HD mode.
Organization: Section II introduces the system model.
Closed form expressions for the ergodic secrecy rate of FD
and HD communication modes have been numerically derived
in Section III, followed by a discussion on the practical
applications of the derived numerical results in Section IV.
Numerical results demonstrating the validity of the analytical
findings are presented in Section V. Finally, closing remarks
and future outlook are covered in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a small cell with an active transceiver pair,
Alice and Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. An
isolated cell is considered in order to focus the analysis on
FD communication since any out-of-cell interference would
on average affect Eve and the desired receiver similarly due
to their relatively close distances. Alice and Bob can operate
in either FD or HD mode. When operating in FD mode, the
appropriate SIC schemes are assumed to suppress the loopback
self interference power to within tolerable limits. The system
model is depicted in Figure 1, with the random variables
(rv) Π ∈ {X,Y, Z} denoting the random signal-to-noise-
ratio (SNR) of the respective channels among Alice, Bob, and
Eve. The realizations ϕ ∈ {x, y, z} of the respective rv Π is
represented as ϕ = ϕ̄ϕ̃, with ϕ̄ ∈ {µ, φ, ψ} being the mean.
ϕ̃ is a unit mean rv with the same distribution as ϕ.
Fig. 1. System Model showing a standalone Full Duplex Transceiver pair in
the presence of the eavesdropper.
A. Signal Model
1) Desired Signal Power: With FD communication, the
desired signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at Bob
(and Alice) is denoted as γFD = XI+1 , where I denotes
the noise-normalized residual self interference power at the
receiver end following SIC. In the case of HD nodes, there is
no residual self interference power (i.e, I = 0), and the SINR
is simply given by the SNR as in γHD = X.
The desired signal amplitude is assumed to follow a
Nakagami-m fading distribution that includes a wide range
of other distributions as special case via its shape parameter
m [11]. The SNR X is correspondingly distributed according
to the following gamma distribution [11]
fX(x;m,µ) =
mmxm−1
µmΓ(m)
exp
(
−mx
µ
)
, (1)
characterized by the parameter m and the mean SNR µ, and
Γ(m) ,
∫∞
0
tm−1 exp(−t) dt is the Gamma function.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X, defined
as FX(x) =
∫ x
0
fX(t) dt is given by
FX(x;m,µ) =
γ
(
m, mxµ
)
Γ(m)
, (2)
where γ (m,x) ,
∫ x
0
tm−1 exp(−t) dt is the lower incomplete
Gamma function [12, 6.5.2].
2) Signal Power at the Eavesdropper Node: Without loss
of generality, we assume Alice to be the transmitting node in
HD scenario. The eavesdropped message at Eve is received
with the SNR βHD = Y. In contrast, Alice and Bob transmit
simultaneously in FD mode, resulting in an additional source
of interference at Eve. The resulting SINR of the eavesdropped
message at Eve from Alice and Bob are respectively given by
βFD,a =
Y
Z + 1
, βFD,b =
Z
Y + 1
. (3)
Since the eavesdropped signal amplitude is harder to char-
acterize in practice due to Eve being an external node, it
is assumed to follow the widely adopted Rayleigh fading
distribution. The SNR Y (and Z) with mean φ(ψ) are corre-
spondingly distributed according to the following exponential
distributions [11]
fY (y;φ) =
1
φ
exp
(
− y
φ
)
, fZ(z;ψ) =
1
ψ
exp
(
− z
ψ
)
.
In order to derive the distribution of βFD1, we first condition
on the rv z in order to obtain
fβ,FD(u) =
exp
(
−uφ
)
φ
Ez
[
(z + 1) exp
(
−uz
φ
)]
, (4)
where E[·] is the expectation operator. Following some alge-
braic manipulations, the probability density function (PDF) of
βFD is derived as
fβ,FD(u) =
exp (−u/φ)
uψ + φ
[
φψ
uψ + φ
+ 1
]
. (5)
Additionally, the CDF of βFD evaluates to
Fβ,FD(u) = 1−
exp (−u/φ)
1 + uψφ
. (6)
B. Secrecy Rate Analysis
Information theoretic security characterizes the fundamental
ability of the physical layer to provide confidentiality. The
secrecy rate is the rate at which two nodes can communicate
without an eavesdropper being able to ovearhear the message.
Following [13], we define the secrecy rate of the Alice-Bob
link in the presence of Eve as the difference between the rates
of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links.
1) Secrecy Rate with HD: Considering the Alice-Bob link
as the active HD link and assuming the Shannon rate can be
achieved at every resource slot, the desired achievable rate
between Alice and Bob is simply Rx = log (1 + x) whereas
the unwanted eavesdropped rate at Eve is Ry = log (1 + y) (all
logarithms are base 2). The instantaneous secrecy rate with HD
transmissions is then given by SHD = max {Rx −Ry, 0} .
2) Secrecy Rate with FD: Alice and Bob can simulta-
neously communicate in FD modes, with both transmis-
sions subject to potential overhearing by Eve. The achievable
rate between Alice and Bob can be expressed as Rab =
log (1 + γFD) . Moreover, the achievable rate at Eve con-
sidering the transmission from Alice to Bob is Rae =
log (1 + βFD,a) with βFD,a given by Eq. (3). Consequently,
1The index is henceforth dropped as the usage is clear from the context.
the instantaneous secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link with
FD transmission is SFD,a = max {Rab −Rae, 0} .
On a similar note, the instantaneous secrecy rate of the
reverse Bob to Alice link with FD transmissions is SFD,b =
max {Rab −Rbe, 0} , where Rbe = log (1 + βFD,b) . Finally,
the instantaneous secrecy rate of the considered system with
FD communication is SFD = SFD,a + SFD,b.
III. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
The ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) of half duplex and full
duplex communication is respectively analysed in this section.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate Analysis for HD Communication
The ESR can be obtained by averaging SHD over the
distributions of the r.v.s x and y, and is derived as
S̄HD = E [SHD] = E [log(1 + x)− log(1 + y)] Pr[x > y]
= log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x)FY (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+ log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)fY (y)FX(y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)fY (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
, (7)
where Pr[·] denotes probability, and FY (y) , 1− exp(−y/φ)
is the CDF of Y.
Since the direct evaluation of the integrals J1, J2, and J3
in Eq. (7) are not straightforward, we will use the Meijer’s G
function to obtain a closed form expression. The Meijer’s G
function is a highly general class of integral function that can
be used to represent a wide variety of functions and lends itself
to succinct integral manipulations. The Meijer’s G function,
designated by the symbol Gm,np,q [x], is defined in [14, Eq. (5)].
Efficient implementations of the Meijer’s G function is readily
available in Mathematica and Matlab [15]. The representations
of the logarithm and exponential function in terms of the
Meijer’s G function presented below [14, Eq. (11)]
ln (1 + x) = G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
, e−x = G1,00,1
[
x
∣∣∣∣−0
]
. (8)
The lower incomplete Gamma function γ(m,x) can simi-
larly be represented as γ(m,x) =
∫ x
0
tm−1G1,00,1
[
t
∣∣−
0
]
dt =
G1,11,2
[
x
∣∣∣ 1m,0 ] [16, Eq. (07.34.21.0002.01)].
1) Evaluating J1: Substituting FY (y) = 1−exp(−y/φ) in
Eq. (7), the integral J1 can expands to
J1 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J11
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) exp(−x/φ)fX(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J12
. (9)
Further substituting the distribution fX(x) given by Eq. (1)
into the above, and isolating the integral J11, we obtain
J11 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)
mmxm−1
µmΓ(m)
exp
(
−mx
µ
)
dx
=
log(e)mm
µmΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1G1,00,1
[
mx
µ
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
dx
=
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ
m
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
, (10)
where the last step is obtained using [14, Eq. (21)].
Following similar steps, the integral J12 in Eq. (9) can be
evaluated in terms of the Meijer’s G function as
J12 =
log(e)
(
1 + µmφ
)−m
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µφ
mφ+ µ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
. (11)
2) Evaluating J2: The integral J2 expands as
J2 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)
1
φ
exp
(
− y
φ
)
γ(m, ym/µ)
Γ(m)
dy
=
log(e)
φΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
G1,22,2
[
y
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
×G1,00,1
[
y
φ
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,11,2
[
my
µ
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
]
dy, (12)
where the last step follows from substituting the logarithm,
the exponential, and the lower incomplete gamma functions
with their respective representation in terms of the Meijer’s G
function. The integral J2 in Eq. (12) is an integration involving
the product of three Meijer’s G functions. The solution is a
Meijer’s G function of two variables that can be expressed in
terms of the extended generalized bivariate Meijer’s G function
(EGBMGF), as introduced in [16, Eq. (07.34.21.0081.01)].
Applications of the EGBMGF have been demonstrated in [17],
while its efficient implementation is readily available in Math-
ematica [17, Table II] and Matlab [18]. Using the EGBMGF,
the integral J2 can be obtained in closed form as
J2 =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
∣∣∣∣φ, mφµ
]
. (13)
3) Evaluating J3: The last integral J3 in Eq. (7), which
reads J3 =
log(e)
φ
∫∞
0
ln(1 + y) exp (−y/φ) can be solved
following similar steps as in Eq. (10) by substituting m = 1
and µ = φ, which results in J3 = log(e)G
1,3
3,2
[
φ
∣∣∣ 1,1,01,0 ].
Consolidating the integrals J1, J2, and J3, the ESR in
conventional HD mode is given in closed form by
S̄HD = J11 − J12 + J2 − J3. (14)
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate Analysis for FD Communication
With FD communication, the total instantaneous secrecy
rate of our single user system is the sum of the instan-
taneous secrecy capacities of both the transmission direc-
tions, i.e. SFD = max {log(1 + γFD)− log(1 + βFD,a), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SFD,a
+ max {log(1 + γFD)− log(1 + βFD,b), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SFD,b
.
The ergodic secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link with FD
transmission can be expanded as
S̄FD,a =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)fγFD (x)FβFD,a(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
+
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβFD,a(u)FγFD (u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
−
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβFD,a(u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
, (15)
where the PDF and CDF of γFD follows from Eqs. (1) and (2)
with µ replaced by µI+1 , while the PDF and CDF of βFD,a
have been derived in Section II-A.
1) Evaluating K1: Using Eqs. (1) and (6), the integral
K1 can be expanded as K1 =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)fγFD (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K11
−
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)e(−
x
φ )
(
1 +
xψ
φ
)−1
fγFD (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K12
. Following
the steps involved in evaluating J11, the integral K11 can be
expressed in closed form as
K11 =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ̃
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
, (16)
where the constant µ̃ is defined as µ̃ = µ(I+1)m .
On the other hand, the second integral K12 =
log(e)
µ̃mΓ(m)
∫∞
0
xm−1
(1+ψφ x)
exp
(
−
(
1
µ̃ +
1
φ
)
x
)
ln(1 + x) dx can be
expanded as an integration involving a product of three Mei-
jer’s G functions; with a close form solution in terms of the
EGBMGF as follows
K12 =
log(e)
µ̃mΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1G1,00,1
[(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
x
∣∣∣∣−0
]
×G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
G1,11,1
[
ψ
φ
x
∣∣∣∣00
]
dx
=
(
1 + µ̃φ
)−m
ln(2)Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
m
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
,
where the second step follows from the relation (1 + cx)α =
G1,11,1
[
cx
∣∣α+1
0
]
/Γ(−α) [14, Eq. (10)].
2) Evaluating K2: Substituting the respective gamma CDF
and the PDF of the SINR βFD at the eavesdropper derived
in Eq. (5), the integral K2 is expanded as a product of
four distinct terms that can be represented as four different
Meijer’s G functions. However, an integration involving four
Meijer’s G functions is not readily solvable. To overcome
this limitation, we proposed to approximate the gamma pa-
rameter m with its closest integer. In that case, the CDF
of the rv X can be expressed using the recurrence rela-
tion γ(m + 1, x) = mγ(m,x) − xm exp(−x) for integer
positive m as γ(m,x)Γ(m) = 1 − exp (−x)
∑m−1
n=0
xn
n! [12, Eq.
(6.5.13)]. We can then approximate the integral K2 as K2 ≈∫∞
0
log(1 + u)
(
1− exp
(
−uµ̃
)∑m−1
n=0
un
µ̃nn!
)
fβFD,a(u) du.
Following some further algebraic manipulations, K2 is sub-
sequently solved as
K2 = K3 −
2∑
α=1
ψα−1
φ
m−1∑
n=0
1
µ̃nn!
∫ ∞
0
un ln(1 + u)
× exp
(
−
(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
u
)(
1 +
ψ
φ
u
)−α
du
= K3 −
2∑
α=1
µ̃ψα−1
ln(2)(µ̃+ φ)
m−1∑
n=0
(
1 + µ̃φ
)−n
n!︸
×G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
n+ 1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1− α0
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
︷︷ ︸
K′2
. (17)
Final Expression for S̄FD,a: Ultimately, the final expression
for ergodic secrecy rate for the Alice to Bob link with FD
transmission is given in terms of K11,K12, and K ′2 derived
above as S̄FD,a = K11−K12−K ′2. The expression for S̄FD,b,
i.e. the ergodic secrecy rate for the reverse direction (Bob to
Alice), can be similarly derived with ψ and φ replacing each
other.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE SECRECY RESULT FINDINGS
Applications of the derived ergodic secrecy rate findings in
an emerging 5G system are briefly outlined in this section.
A. Applications in Device to Device Communication
Future 5G system envisions direct device-to-device (D2D)
communication as one of the key technologies to accommo-
date the demanding design requirements. FD communication
has been proposed for such D2D communications, especially
considering the close range of the devices and the symmetric
nature of the traffic profile in both directions [19].
Due to its very nature, D2D communication cannot guar-
antee the same level of security as do cellular networks. The
findings presented in this work demonstrates that a very high
degree of physical layer security can be achieved by enabling
FD communication between the D2D nodes. Hence, alongside
the desirable gains in terms of TP, latency, and device discov-
ery time, FD can also solve an important technical challenge
in D2D communication, namely ensuring confidentiality.
B. Applications in Cellular Networks with BS FD
Despite the potential benefits of FD communication, it may
not be readily available for commercial deployment at the
UE level in the recent future due to size, power, and cost
constraints. An intermediate proposal is to equip only the base
stations with FD capabilities, and is termed as a base station
full duplex (BS-FD) architecture [1].
The investigations in this contribution have revealed that the
simultaneous transmission from both end of a FD communica-
tion link is the main contributor to the enhanced physical layer
security. Such a finding can be utilized to accord protection
to an UE scheduled in the uplink direction in need of strong
physical layer security in a BS-FD network.
In the downlink direction, the BS with FD capability can
schedule an UE in close vicinity of the uplink UE, as depicted
in Figure 2. The eavesdropped signal at any eavesdropper in
the vicinity of the scheduled uplink UE will be masked by
the simultaneous downlink transmission to another nearby UE,
thereby resulting in the strong secrecy rate demonstrated in this
paper. Note however that, the downlink scheduled UE would
also be affected by the uplink transmission. The transmission
in the downlink direction must therefore be either artificial
noise, or transmitted with a sufficiently low data rate. Hence
the enhanced physical layer security for the BS-FD network
setup is achieved at the expense of sacrificing the downlink
data rate.
C. Applications in Conventional HD Cellular Networks
The concept of scheduling users to enhance the secrecy rate
can be further extended to conventional HD networks as shown
in Figure 2. An UE scheduled in the uplink direction in need
of strong physical layer security can be concurrently scheduled
with a nearby UE, also in the uplink direction. Let us term the
two UEs as the protected and the protecting UE respectively.
If the BS is equipped with interference cancellation or
interference suppression type receivers, the traffic of both the
UEs can be simultaneously decoded with a well designed
radio resource management technique such as link and/or
rank adaptation. On the other hand, the protecting UE can be
scheduled with traffic that is already known at the BS, which
would make the resulting interference easily treatable.
Fig. 2. Enhancing Physical layer security though scheduling to induce a FD-
like scenario at the eavesdropper node.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The ergodic secrecy rate findings with FD and HD com-
munication are numerically validated through Matlab R© based
Monte Carlo simulations in this Section. At least 100, 000
independent snapshots of each scenario are simulated to ensure
statistical reliability. Unless stated otherwise, the following
simulation parameters are assumed to reflect a typical prop-
agation scenario: gamma parameter m = 2, residual self
interference I = 1 and φ = ψ (Eve equidistant from Alice
and Bob).
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of µ and φ
The ESR of FD and HD communication for different
ratios of the desired and eavesdropper channel SNR (i.e. µφ )
with respect to (w.r.t.) the mean SNR µ are presented in
Fig. 3. Weak, medium, and strong eavesdropper channels are
considered, corresponding to µφ = [10, 0, and −10] dB.
Some surprising findings are revealed. First of all, FD is
found to considerably enhance the physical layer secrecy rate
over conventional HD communication. This is due to the
simultaneous transmission from both the transmitter and the
receiver, which generates an additional source of interference
at Eve. The resulting interference acts as a natural deterrent to
eavesdropping attempt, thereby enhancing the physical layer
security potential of FD communication.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the ESR in FD mode is
almost independent of the strength towards the eavesdropper
channel, especially at higher mean SNR values. In contrast,
the ESR with HD is strongly dependent on the eavesdropper
channel strength relative to the desired channel, and is found
to approach zero even at µφ = 10 dB.
Finally, the slope of the ESR curves are also distinctly
different for FD and HD communication. In conventional HD
mode, the ESR is found to flatten out and converge to a
constant as µ → ∞. On the other hand, the ESR with FD
communication is observed to grow linearly w.r.t. µ (in dB).
Mean SNR μ (dB)
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Fig. 3. The ergodic secrecy rate of full duplex and half duplex communication
for different values of µ and φ.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of the Residual Self
Interference Power I
The residual self interference power I is an important pa-
rameter for FD communication. In this subsection, we explore
its impact on the ergodic secrecy rate. The ESR corresponding
to perfect SIC ( IN = 0), SIC to the level of noise floor
( IN = 1), and
I
N = 10 are presented w.r.t. µ in Fig. 4.
Furthermore, asymmetricity in the eavesdropper channel is
also considered by choosing ψ/φ = [2, 5], while η = µφ is
set at 10 dB.
First of all, asymmetricity in the eavesdropper channel, i.e.,
having φ 6= ψ, has little impact on the ESR, especially at
higher values of µ. In contrast, the residual self interference
power plays an important role. In fact, for lower values of µ,
the ESR in FD mode is lower than that of HD mode with
I
N set to 10 dB. This reiterates the well know maxim for FD
communication that significant gains with FD communication
requires a strong direct link (i.e., large µ) and sufficient
isolation of the self interference power.
Though not shown in Fig. 4, the plots for different IN values
are found to converge to the same secrecy rate as µ → ∞,
which further reveals that the ESR in FD mode is independent
of the residual self interference power I as µ→∞.
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Fig. 4. The ergodic secrecy rate of full duplex and half duplex communication
w.r.t. µ for different values of the self interference power I.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In this contribution, we have presented a thorough analysis
of the potential of full duplex communication in enhancing
the physical layer security of a wireless link. A closed form
expression for the ergodic secrecy rate has been derived
considering the Nakagami-m fading model. The findings are
presented as a function of the eavesdropper channel strength
and residual self interference power. Finally, numerical results
via simulation demonstrating the validity of the derived results
have been presented. The analytical findings are found to
closely match the simulation results in all scenarios, thereby
validating the accuracy of the derived results.
Contrary to the limited TP gain potential, FD communi-
cation is found to provide a high degree of physical layer
security. In particular, the ergodic secrecy rate with full duplex
communication is found to grow linearly with the log of the
direct channel’s SNR as opposed to the flattened out secrecy
rate with conventional half duplex communication, irrespective
of the eavesdropper channel strengths. Such compelling se-
crecy rates are found to be valid even with strong residual self
interference power under moderate SNR conditions. As part
of the future work, we plan to extend our study by analysing
other physical layer security metrics such as the secure outage
probability and the strictly positive secrecy probability.
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